ABSTRACT The establishment and development of an integrated energy market (IEM) contributes to the equitable distribution of electrical and thermal energy production resources. However, the application of conventional locational marginal price theory generally fails to promote the declaration of truthful marginal costs by market participants in the process of clearing and settlement of the IEM, which detracts from market fairness and may reduce market efficiency. Simultaneously, the continuous expansion in the scale of renewable energy sources (RESs) threatens the safe and stable operation of electrical power systems. Accordingly, the present study seeks to improve the efficiency of the IEM under large-scale RES penetration, and promote the truthful declarations of market participants by applying a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction scheme to the IEM, and establishes a two-stage IEM model that promotes compatibility between the incentives of market participants to enhance market fairness. The present study also addresses the imbalance between market revenue and expenditure typically produced by the VCG auction scheme by designing an ex-post payment redistribution mechanism to ensure the equitable cost recovery of all market participants. Simulation results demonstrate that the application of the proposed VCG auction system to the IEM ensures maximum efficiency, cost recovery, and incentive compatibility as dominant strategies, and helps to integrate large-scale RES penetration with the IEM.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Regional integrated energy systems (RIESs) are an important physical carrier of the energy internet that promises the integrated delivery of energy and information. Here, an RIES integrates multiple energy sources on a regional scale, and may include a distributed electric system (DES), a distributed heating system (DHS), a distributed gas system (DGS), and energy converters (ECs) such as combined heating and power (CHP) units that convert natural gas into electricity and heat, and micro gas turbines (MGTs) that convert natural gas to electrical power. The integration of multiple energy sources by an RIES takes advantage of the coupling characteristics of these various sources in space and time to realize their complementary utilization, and to provide new solutions for addressing energy shortages [1] . One or more RIESs and market participants together form an integrated energy market (IEM). These market participants include integrated energy market operators (IEMO), energy producers (EPs), and energy loads (ELs). The day-ahead market is conducted on the day prior to energy delivery. Here, an IEMO clears the IEM based on the production marginal cost provided by the EPs and the next-day energy demands provided by the ELs to schedule production and consumption levels and day-ahead market-clearing prices [2] to settle the IEM. Meanwhile, sufficient reserve capacity is prepared to accommodate possible uncertainties in real-time operation efficiently in accordance with the real-time market, which occurs in the period prior to energy delivery and is the market mechanism that balances production and consumption. As such, the development of RIESs is closely linked with the establishment of IEMs, which are conducive to the fair distribution of production resources and the friendly interaction between EPs and energy consumers [3] . Accordingly, many countries have presently begun to develop pilot IEMs, and the related market systems and mechanisms have been continuously improved. Nordic countries in particular, such as Finland and Sweden, have highly developed IEMs, which have effectively solved the price monopoly problem [3] . The practical experience of the IEM implemented in Quebec, Canada has demonstrated that the close combination of electricity, natural gas, and thermal markets can effectively promote reductions in energy consumption and the emissions of harmful gases [4] . The Chinese government has also begun to actively implement a pilot IEM to promote the marketization of energy trading in China. Most existing IEM settlement and trading mechanisms employed worldwide are based on the spot market, which functions according to a perfect competition model where the locational marginal price (LMP) is adopted for market clearing [5] . However, both theory and practice have demonstrated that the LMP mechanism generally fails to promote the declaration of truthful marginal costs by market participants in the process of clearing and settlement of the IEM. Here, tense market supply and demand relationships or line congestions provide EPs with economic incentives to present falsely high marginal cost quotes to increase the LMP, and thereby increase their profits [6] . Naturally, this type of behavior stems from the incompatible incentives of the market participants that undermine fair competition, and will ultimately have a negative impact on market efficiency by changing the economic distribution of dispatching and reducing social welfare [6] - [9] .
The above-discussed problem has been addressed by efforts to develop incentive compatibility strategies to create market conditions whereby the truthful performance of market participants represents their optimal strategy to realize the maximization of their individual interests rationally. This is consistent with the outcomes of strategies developed in the field of mechanism design, such as the VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) auction strategy [10] . At present, many scholars have studied the implementation of incentive compatibility via VCG auction. For example, the respective market clearing results based on VCG and LMP have been analyzed and compared [11] . Applying VCG auction to the electricity market has been demonstrated to improve the economic benefits of EPs [12] . Moreover, VCG auction has also been demonstrated to be applicable to the storage of energy, such as for ensuring the truthful declaration of battery energy storage parameters [13] .
The impact of renewable energy sources (RESs) such as wind power and photovoltaic arrays on the functionality of IEMs is another problematic issue. For example, RES participation in IEMs is commonly implemented using feedin tariffs (FIT), whose prices are currently set by government departments and related companies, and the uncertainty of RES output owing to random variations in, e.g., wind speed and cloud cover is often not considered [14] . However, the impact of RES output uncertainty on the IEM can be neglected only if the level of RES penetration is limited because this impact becomes increasingly obvious and more complex as the level of RES penetration increases, which ultimately affects the operating costs of IEMs and the economic benefits of market participants. In addition, the uncertainty of RES output further increases the power reserve capacity requirements of RIESs to meet load demands under possible extreme fluctuations in RES power production. Here, twostage stochastic dispatch, which divides the power dispatch problem into day-ahead energy-reserve dispatch and realtime operation, has been demonstrated to be capable of effectively addressing the impact of RES output uncertainty on RIES operations [2] . Moreover, the energy supply plan made in the day-ahead market can be adjusted in the realtime market according to two-stage stochastic dispatch in real time, which can ensure better adaptation of an IEM to the uncertainty of RES output and improve market efficiency [15] . The impacts of demand and supply uncertainties on the optimal design of RIESs have also been investigated systematically [16] - [18] . Meanwhile, two-stage dispatch has been applied for facilitating electric power distribution decisions regarding grid purchase, generation unit dispatching, and interruptible load scheduling [19] .
In this paper, we apply an incentive-compatible mechanism based on VCG auction to improve the efficiency of IEM operations in both the day-ahead and real-time markets (i.e., two-stage IEM) under high RES penetration. The present work makes the following contributions.
1) A convex two-stage stochastic programming model of an RIES is established to determine RIES production and consumption levels, and arrange the energy reserve capacity. The impact of RES output uncertainty on the RIES is appropriately predicted to achieve economic system operation. 2) The VCG auction mechanism is applied to a twostage IEM model to motivate market participants to declare truthful marginal costs. Then, the incentive compatibility of the scheme was proved. The theory was proved that the mechanism satisfies the dominant strategy incentive compatibility, which can effectively stimulate the EPs to report the cost truthfully.
3) The VCG auction scheme can result in budget deficits for IEMOs that should be exogenously recovered based on additional payments from market participants [20] . Therefore, we quantify budget imbalances of IEM as positive and negative, and propose an ex-post mechanism to partially recover revenue adequacy. Here, positive and negative budget imbalances are respectively redistributed by proportionally rewarding and charging market participants for their contributions toward the corresponding budget imbalance. Accordingly, the application of the proposed VCG auction scheme to the IEM ensures maximum efficiency, costrecovery, and incentive-compatibility as dominant strategies, and helps to integrate large-scale RES penetration with the IEM. These benefits of the proposed development are verified based on simulations employing two different test conditions involving changing heat demands and varying RES penetrations for a realistic RIES.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the IEM framework and the model assumptions. Sections III and IV establish the LMP mechanism for the two-stage IEM, and the VCG auction mechanism, respectively. Section V presents the simulation case studies considering multiple conventional and wind power EPs that compete in the IEM. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. MARKET FRAMEWORK AND MODEL ASSUMPTIONSS A. MARKET FRAMEWORK
The main research object of this paper is the typical cityscale RIES illustrated in Fig. 1 . The RIES consists of a DES, a DHS, a DGS, and ECs. The DES obtains and transmits electrical power derived from local electrical power generation units (such as RESs, which are here denoted by a single wind farm), external (i.e., non-local) electrical power grids, and ECs. The DGS purchases natural gas directly from liquid natural gas (LNG) facilities to meet its natural gas supply needs. The heat energy required for the DHS derives from local heating equipment (such as heating boilers; HBs). According to Fig. 1 , we consider stochastic and deterministic EPs in the IEM, where stochastic EPs are associated with RESs and deterministic EPs are associated with conventional power production devices such as MGTs. As discussed, an IEMO clears the IEM in the day-ahead market. However, another important responsibility of an IEMO is to plan the energy reserves of the RIES and adjust the system in real time the following day to cope with the uncertainty of RES output.
B. RIES MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The primary model assumptions in this paper are described as the follows.
1) The more rigorous non-convex and nonlinear RIES model is not conducive toward obtaining solutions of the LMP. Therefore, we employ a linearized RIES model, where the second-order cone (SOC) relaxation method is applied to relax the nonlinear DES and DGS equations to obtain linear forms [15] . We also apply a widely used model of a DHN under a constant flow and variable temperature (CF-VT) control strategy [21] .
2) The load demands of the ELs are considered to be deterministic because these are much less stochastic than RES output. Stochastic scenario modeling, where each scenario has a corresponding probability of occurrence, is applied to describe the uncertainty of RES output in the real-time market.
3) The outputs of the RESs are considered to be ostensibly controlled by utility companies, and their marginal cost is zero [22] . In addition, all RESs (i.e., wind farms) are at all times subject to an equivalent wind speed.
III. TWO-STAGE MARKET BASED LMP MECHANISM
The first step of the proposed approach for enforcing incentive compatibility in the IEM is to ensure efficient economic dispatch by clearing the two-stage IEM model based LMP mechanism, which guarantees market efficiency under an assumption of a perfectly competitive market. In the proposed two-stage IEM model, all market participants are included. All participants are considered to be price-takers and submit their true cost/utility to the IEMO. As such, we assume a perfectly competitive market.
A. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
The two-stage IEM clearing process is based on the LMP, and takes the maximization of social welfare as the objective function. Here, we define the total social welfare as follows:
However, optimization problems are generally defined as minimization problems. Therefore, we convert objective VOLUME 7, 2019 function (1) to reflect a minimization of the negative total social benefit [9] :
where F 0 includes the energy and reserve capacity costs as follows.
Day−ahead energy costs
In addition, F S includes energy redispatch and load shedding costs as follows.
Banlancing costs(loadshedding costs)
Finally, F U in (2) can be expressed as follows.
B. DAY-AHEAD MARKET
The DES model in day-ahead market is given as follows.
Here, (6) and (7) represent the active and reactive power flow equations of bus j, respectively. The relationships between the bus voltage, the branch flows, and the current are represented in (8) and (9), respectively. The inequality constraints of the DES are presented in (10)- (15) , which include DGS output constraints, voltage constraints, and line constraints. The reserve capacity constraints are presented in (16)- (19) . In addition, the non-convex equation (9) can be transformed into the form of a convex equation represented in (20) by SOC relaxation, which can be expressed in the standard form given by (21) [15] .
The DGS model is given as follows.
Here, (22) represents the node flow balance equation and (23) represents the relationship between node air pressure and pipeline flow. The natural gas supply equation is given in (24) , and (25)- (32) are the inequality constraints of the DGS.
The relationship between the node pressure and the flow rate shown in (23) is non-convex, and can be transformed into the form of a convex equation represented in (33) by SOC relaxation, where the standard form is given in (34) [15] .
Finally, the CF-VT model of the DHS can be expressed as follows. 
In addition, the constraints of the EC devices can be expressed as follows.
Here, (51) and (53) are the operational constraints of the MGTs, and (52) is the operational constraint of the CHP units [23] .
C. REAL-TIME MARKET Because the energy reserve was determined according to the submitted plans of the market participants, the uncertainty of RES output was not considered, and the production levels of the stochastic EPs cannot be accurately predicted before the day-ahead market closes. Therefore, an IEMO must adjust the market in real time to balance its clearing price. In this subsection, the real-time market constraints that are equivalent to those of the day-ahead market are not repeated. All non-redundant constraints of the real-time market are given as follows. 
The model represented by (74)- (76) is an SOC optimization problem, and it is essentially a convex problem. The optimality of the solution and the computational efficiency have excellent characteristics [25] . Existing SOC optimization algorithms can easily solve difficult nonlinear problems [26] . In this paper, the model is solved using the MOSEK solver in GAMS running on a personal computer with an Intel Core 2.8 GHz CPU and 8 GB of RAM.
IV. INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE MARKET UNDER THE VCG MECHANISM
The second step of the proposed approach applies the VCG auction strategy, which reflects the economic impact of each participant on social welfare by demanding charges from ELs and determining payments to EPs based on their individual contributions toward maximizing the social welfare. Note that VCG auction ensures a perfectly competitive IEM, through a payment scheme which aligns the objectives of individual participants with the maximization of social welfare.
A. VCG PAYMENTS TO EPS
Here, we calculate the revenue of the J -th EP. The social welfare when J does not participate in the IEM is derived from the solution of the following optimization problem.
Meanwhile, J is excluded from constraints (75) and (76). The solution to (77) is then employed in (2) to obtain the total social welfare R[SW −J ] t corresponding to the time period t when J does not participate in the IEM. This process is repeated for each EP by excluding one EP at a time. Finally, the payment to EP J is given as
Each EP's settlement is defined according to the cost submission of other EPs and its own mentioned benefits, so the EP has no incentive to falsely report high cost.
B. VCG PAYMENTS TO ELS
Next, we calculate the charges for the consumption of the K -th EL. The social welfare when K does not participate in the IEM is derived from the solution of the following optimization problem.
Meanwhile, K is excluded from constraints (75) and (76). The solution to (79) is then employed in (2) to obtain the total social welfare R[SW −K ] t corresponding to the time period t when K does not participate in the IEM. This process is repeated for each EL by excluding one EL at a time. Finally, the charges for the consumption of K is give as
(80)
C. PROOF OF PROPERTIES
The incentive compatibility properties of the above settlement schemes will be demonstrated in this section. Taking EPs as an example, when J -th EP declares the true cost c J , and other EPs declare any costĉ −J , the payment to EP J is given as
Note that the first item on the right end of (83) and (86) is only related to the reported operation cost of other EPs. So the difference value between δ * * and δ * is calculated by (87).
If the EPs make a strategic reports, that is, the reported value deviates from the true marginal cost, or the EPs exit the IEM, it will make it difficult for the market clearing plan to maximize social welfare. Therefore, (87) is non-negative. That is, the net profit of J -th EP obtained by reporting the truthful cost is not less than the net profit at the time of truthless submission of cost. Such a result indicates that the true marginal cost of each EP submission is its optimal choice, rather than the strategic reporting of truthless costs.
Similarly, the same proof method can be used for ELs.
D. BUDGET IMBALANCE REDISTRIBUTION UNDER THE VCG MECHANISM
Applying the truthful submission of the marginal cost of each EP as the dominant market strategy has been proven to guarantee that the payment received by each EP cannot be less than its marginal cost [9] . As such, the revenue received by an EP must necessarily be greater or equal to its operational cost if its profit is non-negative. However, the VCG mechanism cannot guarantee such a budget balance [26] . We define the budget imbalance in the IEM as follows:
A value S BI ,t < 0 indicates that the IEM has a budget deficit while S BI ,t > 0 indicates that the IEM has a budget excess, and the payments should be redistributed to the market participants accordingly. A fair and reasonable redistribution mechanism requires that the redistribution mechanism correspond to the individual contribution of each market participant to the revenue adequacy of the IEM [26] . Here, we solve the market clearing problem after excluding each market participant α in turn, and calculate the budget imbalance S −α,t without α. Note that α can be either an EP or an EL. If S −α,t > 0 and S BI ,t < 0, then the participation of α in the market contributes toward a negative budget imbalance, and α should be charged accordingly. In contrast, when S BI ,t > 0, we can conclude that α contributes toward the budget excess if S −α,t < S BI ,t , and α should be rewarded accordingly. Finally, if α is found to have no effect on the budget imbalance, then the revenue of α is not affected by the redistribution mechanism. Accordingly, the proposed redistribution mechanism can distinguish those participants whose market participation jeopardizes revenue adequacy and those whose participation is contributing toward achieving revenue adequacy.
After determining the contribution of each participant to the budget imbalance, we must then determine the amount of funds that must be accordingly redistributed to each participant. We define the amount of the redistributed payment as
where N α is the number of market participants. Under conditions where revenue adequacy is not satisfied (i.e., S BI ,t < 0), the cost recovery of each participant is imposed under an ex-post redistribution mechanism based on the total profit of the participant and the amount determined by (71). More specifically, if the total profit of the participant is positive, then the redistribution payment calculated by (71) is applied directly as the compensation. However, if the total profit of the participant is negative, then the redistribution payment calculated by (89) is increased so that it exactly compensates for the negative profit of the participant, which results in a zero total profit for the participant. Similarly, under conditions where revenue adequacy is satisfied (i.e., S BI ,t > 0), each participant that contributes toward a positive budget imbalance is rewarded by an amount q RM ,α,t . The advantages of the above redistribution mechanism have been described and analyzed elsewhere [9] . This mechanism does not affect the efficiency of the two-stage IEM, and ensures ex-post cost recovery by constraining the redistribution payment according to the VCG profit/utility of each participant.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES A. BASIC CONFIGURATIONS
The validity of the proposed model and method were verified by application to the RIES illustrated in Fig. 2 , which is composed of a 33-bus DES, an 11-node DGS [26] , and the 33-node DHS of the Barry Island heat network installation [27] . The reported marginal costs of the EPs are listed in Table 1 . Fig. 2 .
B. SCENARIO DATA
The base case energy requirements for the test RIES over a 24 h period are shown in Fig. 3 based on real-world data obtained from the PJM market of America. The total electric load is 3.71 MW, the total gas load is 1.98 MW, and the total heat load is 1.90 MW over the 24 h period. The RES output scenario data is shown in Fig. 4 based on real-world historical RES output data obtained from the National Energy Laboratory over a 24 h period with a total installed capacity of 1.7 WM. Ten stochastic scenarios and the basic scenario were obtained by applying scenario reduction techniques to the historical data.
C. CASE STUDY 1
The convertibility and complementarity of energy sources in the RIES is a major advantage affecting the efficiency of integrated systems. However, unsynchronized changes in electricity, gas, and heat demands can affect the clearing and settlement of the IEM. Hence, we designed the following cases to research the effect of energy demand increases on the incentive compatibility mechanism. 1) Case 1A: base-case demands.
2) Case 1B: heat demand increased by 20%.
3) Case 1C: heat demand increased by 40%. Table 2 shows the total demand utility, system cost, and social welfare for the three different cases over the 24 h period, where the social welfare is the difference between the demand utility and the system cost. The total demand utility of Case 1B and Case 1C respectively increased by 4.64% and 8.87% compared with Case 1A, the total system cost increased by 4.77% and 9.18%, respectively, and the total social welfare increased by 4.58% and 8.82%, respectively. It can be seen from the above results that, although the increases in heat demand increased the operating cost of the system, these also increased the total social welfare to some extent.
1) IMPACTS OF HEAT DEMAND ON DEMAND UTILITY, SYSTEM COST, AND SOCIAL WELFARE
FIGURE 5.
Periodic demand utility, system cost, and social welfare of Case 1A.
FIGURE 6. Periodic demand utility, system cost, and social welfare of Case 1B.
FIGURE 7.
Periodic demand utility, system cost, and social welfare of Case 1C.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 present the demand utility, system cost, and social welfare obtained at each time period over the complete 24 h scheduling period for Cases 1A, 1B, and 1C, respectively. It can be seen that the social welfare over the period of high energy demand from 10:00 to 22:00 is greater than that over the low-load periods, and that the social welfare in any period increases with increasing heat load. This is because, on the one hand, an increase in heating demand promotes the consumption of RES output, while, on the other hand, the access ratio of demand in the real-time market increases, and the total utility of energy demands increases, which will eventually increase the total social welfare of the RIES.
2) IMPACTS OF HEAT DEMAND ON EP REVENUES
The high degree of coupling between energy sources in the RIES causes changes in one subsystem to affect the other subsystems through the coupling devices, which then affects the revenues of EPs. Therefore, we plot the periodic expected revenues of representative EPs in the test RIES under the three test cases in Figs. 8 to 10.
It can be seen from Fig. 8 that the revenue of MCT 2 decreases with increasing heat demand during the periods of 01:00-08:00 and 21:00-24:00. At all other times, the revenues under Case 1B and Case 1C are greater than those under Case 1A. In addition, the heat generation of the CHP increases as the heat load increases because the CHP is operated in the ''power determined by heat'' mode, which also results in an increase in the CHP supply of electrical energy to the DES. However, the electric load during the periods of 01:00-08:00 and 21:00-24:00 (Fig. 3) is relatively low and the RES output (Fig. 4) is relatively high. These conditions reduce the active output of MCT 2 , which ultimately leads to a decrease in revenue.
We note from Fig. 9 that the revenue of the LNG source at node 8 increases during the periods of 01:00-08:00 and 21:00-24:00 with increasing heat load. According to the VCG mechanism, the highest benefit can only be obtained when the EP declares its true marginal price. Therefore, the constant revenue observed for this LNG source between 09:00 and 20:00 may occur despite the increasing heat load because the declaration of marginal cost for this EP is truthful during VOLUME 7, 2019 this period. In other words, the maximum profit has been obtained for this EP.
The revenues of HB 1 and HB 2 are respectively shown in Figs. 10 and 11 . It can be seen that the revenues of the two EPs are very different. On the one hand, HB1 is highly competitive in the IEM because it has a low energy unit production cost, and therefore contributes more to the RIES than the other HBs. On the other hand, the truthful declared marginal costs of thermal energy production helps the EP to increase profits, particularly during high load periods. We also note that the revenues of the HBs decreased relatively little between 13:00 and 16:00 for Case 1C, compared to the corresponding reductions for Case 1A and Case 1B. This is because the increased heat load ensures that the actual marginal cost is close to the declared marginal cost of the CB to some extent, and the HB has attained the maximum benefit of the IEM.
D. CASE STUDY 2
The RES penetration level and the uncertainty of RES output have a significant impact on the settlement of each member of the IEM. Therefore, we designed the following cases to investigate the impact of RES penetration and output uncertainty on market imbalances under the proposed IEM methodology. 1) Case 2A: base-case RES generation.
2) Case 2B: installed RES capacity increased by 20%.
3) Case 2C: installed RES capacity increased by 40%. 4) Case 2D: installed RES capacity increased by 60%. These cases are applied under the assumption that the RES output always represents the same proportion of the installed capacity. Moreover, the total energy demand of the ELs is reduced by 15%. We note that the steadily increasing RES capacity in the four test cases represents steadily increasing penetration levels and RES output uncertainties. It can be seen from Table 3 that the total cost of the RIES decreases with increasing RES capacity, while the total demand utility and total social welfare increase with a gradually reducing growth rate. This is due to the limited ability of the RIES to absorb the increasing RES output, and the RES output that cannot be absorbed by the RIES or sold on the IEM can only be abandoned, which is not conducive to the efficient use of energy, and also represents a loss of social welfare.
1) IMPACT OF RES OUTPUT ON THE DAY-AHEAD MARKET PRICE
We define the weighted average price at which an EP is paid as the sum of all individual prices multiplied by the ratio of the individual price to the total traded power in day-ahead market:λ
Similarly, the weighted average price at which an EL is charged can be defined aŝ
As can be seen from Fig. 12 , the day-ahead market price paid by electrical ELs decreases as the RES capacity increases. Simultaneously, we note that the lower marginal cost of stochastic EPs than that of conventional EPs increase their competitiveness in the IEM. Therefore, the increasing RES capacity has a greater impact on the day-ahead market price paid to conventional EPs than stochastic EPs. However, the tight coupling between energy sources in the RIES ensure that the impact of RES output on the DES will also be propagated to the other two subsystems. Accordingly, we note from Fig. 13 that the day-ahead market prices of the heat EPs and natural gas EPs also decrease with increasing RES capacity. 
2) IMPACT OF RES CAPACITY ON BUDGET IMBALANCE
From Fig. 14, we can see that the VCG mechanism leads to income and expenditure imbalances in the two-stage IEM, but that an increasing RES capacity helps to alleviate the problem. For relatively low RES capacities (Case 2A and Case 2B), the market budget is expected to be unbalanced because the total amount charged to the ELs by the IEMO is less than the total amount paid to the EPs. However, this situation changes when the RES capacity is increased. We also note from a comparison of the two plots in Fig. 14 that the application of the income redistribution mechanism can solve the imbalance between IEM revenue and expenditure. Here, we observe that the negative budget imbalances formerly obtained under relatively low RES capacities are fully restored and become positive after redistribution. In addition, rewarding market members who contribute toward revenue adequacy can reduce budget imbalances when income is adequately redistributed.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a two-stage market clearing and settlement mechanism based on the VCG auction to achieve maximum market efficiency by properly motivating IEM participants to truthfully declare their marginal costs via the adoption of compatible market incentives. The VCG mechanism ensures cost recovery for all market participants by assigning energy prices according to the impact of participants on social welfare. The effects of load fluctuations and varying RES capacities on the market clearing and settlement mechanism were analyzed by conducting simulations for a realistic RIES. The results of this extensive analysis help foster a greater understanding of the functioning of the VCG mechanism and incentive compatibility in energy markets. In addition, we applied an after-the-fact solution to compensate for potential negative budget imbalances caused by the VCG auction mechanism.
